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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the past and present condition of Turkey’s relations 
with an ally, the United States, and an old neighbor, Iran, and identifies the 
variables that have divided or united these three important players of the Middle 
East since 1979.  
The goal of this thesis is to answer the following questions: Is Turkish 
foreign policy changing direction? Is there really a common ground for Turkey 
and Iran to cooperate for the stability of the region? Is cooperation possible for 
these two old rival states each of whom has been seeking to be the dominant 
power of this region since the very beginning of their relations’ long history? If 
yes, is it worthwhile for Turkey to improve her relations with Iran even in the face 
of U.S. opposition? In this context, although there seems a relative recovery in 
Turkish-Iranian relations and a decline in Turkey’s relations with the United 
States due to diverging interests in the Middle East, Turkey and the United 
States should realize their importance for each other. They should establish a 
stronger structure to synchronize relations, so they do not end up in a “lose-lose” 
position by ignoring each other’s priorities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Turkey has been a longstanding ally of the United States in the Middle 
East since the end of World War II. She was an important front for the policy of 
containment, or “Truman Doctrine,” that countered the spread of communism 
during the Cold War. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and the threat of 
communism vaporized. This was thought to be the end of East–West conflict and 
the beginning of global stability. Unfortunately, however, the end of the Cold War 
resulted in increased uncertainty as new ethnic conflicts popped up in many parts 
of the world.1  
The new unipolar world order with the hegemony of the United States did 
not change the strong relations between Turkey and the United States until 1 
March 2003. As Henry Bakery observes, “The primary U.S. foreign-policy vision 
after the Cold War was one based on preventing regional disputes from 
threatening its own and its allies' interests and on expanding market reforms and 
democratic principles and practices”.2 Turkey acted consistently with U.S. 
policies in the First Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia and Afghanistan, even 
sometimes with high economic costs (like the Iraq embargo which cost three 
billion dollars a year3 and the more than two million Kurdish refugees who fled 
from Saddam’s attacks to Turkey after the first Gulf War4).  
                                            
1 U.S. Department of State, “Dissolution of the USSR and the Establishment of Independent 
Republics, 1991,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/108229.htm, (accessed February 21, 
2009). 
2 Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey’s Strategic Future: A U.S. Perspective”, Prepared for the 
CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, 12 May 2003, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/1959/01/ESF_WP13.pdf, (accessed February 21, 2009). 
3 Alan Cowell, “Turkish Leader to Press U.S. on Iraq Embargo,” The New York Times, 
October 14, 1993. 
4 Katherine A. Wilkens, “How we lost the Kurdish Game,” The Washington Post, September 
15, 1996.  
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The second Gulf War, however, introduced discord into U.S.–Turkish 
relations. The Turkish parliament’s rejection on March 1, 2003 of a draft 
resolution that would allow U.S. troops to open a northern front into Iraq from 
Turkey was the beginning of a deep decline in U.S.–Turkish relations. This 
decline got deeper with “the sacking incident” in Suleymaniah and consequent 
Kurdish de facto formation of an independent enclave in the north of Iraq.5 From 
then on, a huge anti-Americanism spread over the public in Turkey, which 
showed itself in a Turkish movie named “The Valley of Wolves: Iraq.” As the 
director of Turkey’s International Strategic Researches Institute, Sedat Laciner, 
said “This underscores the public-image problem that the United States has in 
Turkey. The United States is blamed for almost everything that goes wrong in 
Iraq or the Middle East”.6 
While Turkish–American relations were declining, Iran, which was looking 
for a way out from the sanctions imposed by the United States, saw this situation 
as a chance to get closer to Turkey. Historically, Iran is Turkey’s most important 
neighbor and a firm rival in the Middle East. Iran and Turkey are two of the most 
populous countries and influential native actors of this region. These two states 
are very different from other regional states in many ways. They have a deep 
state culture and historical background. They are the heirs of powerful historical 
states in the region. Bilateral Turkish–Iranian relations are as old as history itself. 
According to some observers, Turkey’s repeated frustrations by the European 
Union and a decline in her relations with the United States may result in a 
 
 
                                            
5 Nüzhet Kandemir (Former ambassador of Turkey to Washington DC), “Turkish American 
Relations Past and Future,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1 Spring 2005, 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_21.pdf (accessed February 21, 2009). 
6 Ali Senkaya, “US is not trustable, Iran and Syria should not be attacked, Turkish survey 
claims,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, March 25, 2006, 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=28647 (accessed February 21, 2009). 
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reorientation of her future policies in the region.7 In addition, the latest survey 
carried out by USAK/ISRO among 2500 respondents in Turkey’s five biggest 
cities revealed that “Turks don’t trust the U.S. and are against attack on Iran”.8  
In my thesis, I will examine the past and present condition of Turkey’s 
relations with an ally, the United States, and an old neighbor, Iran, and identify 
the variables that have divided or united these three important players of the 
Middle East since 1979. The goal of this thesis is to answer the following 
questions: Is Turkish foreign policy changing? Is there really common ground on 
which Turkey and Iran may cooperate for the stability of the region? Is it possible 
for these two old rival states, each of whom has been seeking to be the dominant 
power of this region since the Battle of Çaldıran in 1514, to now become allies?9 
If yes, is it worthwhile for Turkey to improve her relations with Iran even in the 
face of U.S. opposition? This evaluation is very important not only for Turkey and 
Iran, but also for the United States and her interests in the region and for the 
future stability of the region itself.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Turkey has been in a struggle to protect the stability of her region since 
the Turkish war of independence. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and 
since the new Turkish republic was established, she came face to face with four 
major challenges: recognition of the newly established Turkish republic, staying 
out of World War II, security challenges from the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War, and the changing political situation and alliances after the Cold War, 
                                            
7 Richard Giragosian, “Redefining Turkey’s Strategic Orientation”,Turkish Policy Quarterly, 
Winter, 2007, http://www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2007-04-
international/richardgiragosian.pdf (accessed February 21, 2009). 
8 Ali Senkaya, “US is not trustable, Iran and Syria should not be attacked, Turkish survey 
claims”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, March 25, 2006, 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=28647 (accessed February 21, 2009). 
9 David Morgan, “Shah Isma’il and the Establishment of Shi’ism”, Medieval Persia: 1040-
1797, Chapter 12. 
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together with the need to find her way in this new era.10 Turkey’s geopolitical 
situation was the dominant factor in her regional importance for a long time. But 
the end of the Cold War, the first Gulf War, the second Gulf War, and frustrations 
with the EU membership process have made her relations with neighbors 
another dominant parameter for her future and for security issues in the region. 
At this point, there are many factors distancing her from U.S. policies and forcing 
Turkey to find some new ways to protect her interests. Strains in U.S.–Turkish 
relations have been caused by many incidents, including the Turkish–Iranian gas 
deal signed in 1996 despite U.S. pressure; denial of permission for the stationing 
of U.S. troops on Turkish territory before the second Gulf War in 2003; the 
situation of Kurds in Iraq’s north after the second Gulf War; the raid of U.S. 
troops on the office of Turkish special forces and arrest of eleven Turkish officers 
in Sulaymaniyah in 2003; the Syrian visit of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in 
2005; the Turkish movie, “Valley Of The Wolves: Iraq” as a reaction to the arrest 
of Turkish officers in Iraq; and a decline in the U.S. image (as seen in survey 








                                            
10 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2003), 1. 
11 Director Andrew Kohut, “15-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey”, he Pew Global Attitudes 
Project, www.pewglobal.org. 
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Figure 1.   15-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey-1 
                 
Figure 2.   15-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey-2 
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The world order started to change after the Cold War, and now members 
of the international system are trying to adapt to the new security challenges and 
looking for new opportunities. In this context, the relations between the U.S., 
Turkey, and Iran are becoming very important for the stability in this new world 
order in the Middle East. The importance of the situation in the Middle East was 
stated by a former prime minister of the United Kingdom with the following words: 
“What is happening today out in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and beyond is 
an elemental struggle about the values that will shape our future”.12 
The unique position of Turkey, which is secular, democratic, and a social 
state governed by the rule of law with her ninety-eight-percent Muslim society 
has been very important and it seems as if it will be more important in dealing 
with 21st century threats in the Middle East.13 Turkey has received the support of 
the United States in many important matters due to her reliable posture. For 
example, one of the most important problems for Turkey is PKK terrorism. The 
United States has listed the PKK as a terrorist organization for a long time, as 
opposed to Iran which started to recognize PKK as a terrorist organization only 
after the barrel turned on her in 2004. Besides that, the United States has been 
not only declared her support of Turkey with words, but has also provided 
important ammunition, weaponry systems, and actionable intelligence to Turkey 
in the war on terrorism, especially during the capture of the leader of the PKK 
terrorist organization, Abdullah Ocalan, and after the 2007 PKK attacks on a 
Turkish outpost very close to Iraq.14  
 
                                            
12 Press Association guardian.co.uk ,“Blair calls for complete rethink of Middle East policy”, 
August 01 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/aug/01/foreignpolicy.syria (accessed 
February 21, 2009). 
13 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Part I General Principles, Article II 
Characteristics of the Republic, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm. 
14 Michael Gunter, “The Kurdish Question”, Online News hour Transcripts, February 17, 
1999. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june99/kurds_2-17.html (accessed 
February 21, 2009). 
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The United States has been fully backing Turkey and lobbying among EU 
states for Turkey in the process of joining the European Union, which is another 
very important issue in Turkish foreign policy. According to the co-director of the 
Brookings Project on Turkey, Ömer Taşpinar, “Washington continued to support 
Turkey in the IMF; Congress passed a bill authorizing the administration to offer 
USD one billion grant to Turkey as compensation and the U.S. continued to 
portray Turkey as an inspiration for democracy in the region”.15  
The United States supported the Baku–Tiflis–Ceyhan oil-pipeline project, 
which has high importance for Turkey as a country seeking to be an energy hub 
and alternative route for Europe.16 
One other important issue in Turkish foreign policy is stability in the Middle 
East in general, the territorial integrity of Iraq, and the future of the Kurds in Iraq 
in particular. The United States has been working very hard on protecting the 
stability and integrity of Iraq, which is important to Turkey’s stability and 
economic development.  
On the other hand, according to the Washington Institute’s Turkish 
research program director, Soner Cagaptay, Turkey has been intensifying her 
relations with Iran in economic, political, and security issues, especially after the 
election of the AKP government, which many fear, believing that Shiite Iran 
poses a challenge to predominantly Sunni Turkey. However, military leaders 
have been expressing their concern about Iran’s nuclear program.17 Turkey’s 
 
 
                                            
15 Ömer Taşpınar, “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey”, The Brookings Institution 
November 16, 2005 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2005/1116turkey_taspinar/taspinar20051116. 
pdf (accessed February 21, 2009). 
16 Robert L. Pollock, “The Sick Man of Europe”, The Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2005 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110006299 (accessed February 21, 
2009). 
17 Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey at a Crossroads, Preserving Ankara’s Western Orientation”, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 11, 2004, 14. 
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present support for Iran’s nuclear research, which is declared to be for “peaceful 
purposes,” may easily turn into a big problem Turkey cannot engage alone in the 
future.  
Turkey’s position is complicated, since she has to protect the emerging 
balance of her interests between East and West and must calculate accurately 
the possible results of getting closer with Iran, which has been being isolated 
from the West for many important reasons, and losing the support of her ally, the 
United States as a superpower. The accuracy of this calculation of Turkey is 
important not only for herself, but for the region and world. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The world order, which was set after World War II, changed after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. “In the past, new international orders were 
established as a result of great wars—by the Treaty of Westphalia after the Thirty 
Years War, by the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic wars, by the Treaty 
of Versailles after World War I, at Yalta and Potsdam after World War II. Keeping 
in step with this history, a new world order should have been established after 
the cold war”.18 In the new order, the importance of energy is well known by all. 
Turkey and Iran as regional players, and the United States as a global player, will 
be in an important position to determine the future of this region.  
Turkey and Iran are the most populous and influential actors of the Middle 
East. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these old rivals became much more 
influential, not only in Middle Eastern politics, but also in central Asia and the 
world. Given that, since the 1920s, world politics is generally concentrated on 
energy centers that are in and around the Middle East, their geopolitical 
positions—Turkey as an important energy-transfer route that brings oil and gas 
                                            
18 Longin Pastusiak (President of the Senate of Poland in 2004), “After the cold war: We 
need to build a new world order”, International Herald Tribune, January 3, 2004, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/01/03/edpast_ed3_.php?page=1 (accessed February 21, 2009). 
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from the east and north to the west and south, and Iran as an important oil and 
gas supplier19—put them at the center of world politics.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Oil Pipelines in Turkey 
 
Figure 4.   Turkey and Iran’s Geopolitical Situation and Energy Sources 
                                            
19 Daniel Fink, “Assessing Turkey’s Future as an Energy Transit Country”, The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, Number 11 (July 2006): 1. 
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Sedat Laciner, director of the International Strategic Research 
Organization (USAK), observes that “When all these data are considered, it is 
natural to expect a serious economic cooperation or even economic integration 
between these two neighbors, Turkey and Iran. However, a thorny picture is 
confronted when the relations are considered”.20 According to Laciner, there has 
always been uncertainty towards Iran among Arabs, Turks, and other Muslim 
nations of the Middle East. The Ottomans and Iran could not manage to be allies 
and ensure any serious economic or political cooperation; furthermore, Iran’s 
relations were much better with the Vatican during that era.21  
Despite their historical rivalry, Turkish–Iranian relations experienced a 
golden era during the Ataturk and Riza Shah Pahlavi period. Both states’ fates 
were similar against the imperial powers. The Soviet-communist threat was one 
of the important causes of good relations between the United States, Turkey, and 
Iran during the Cold War. Turkish–Iranian relations continued cooperatively until 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran. After the Islamic revolution, a 180º turn happened 
in Turkish and U.S. relations with Iran. Iranian efforts at spreading Islamic 
revolution to neighboring countries were at the center of tensions among the new 
regime in Iran, Turkey, and the United States, except for the Erbakan era in 
Turkey. Iran became a target of the United States and faced many sanctions, 
and has always been accused of helping terrorist organizations. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and emerging new world order is again pushing these three 
powers onstage.  
There are two different schools of thoughts about Turkey’s emerging 
position in the international arena after the Cold War and the probable future 
foreign policies in the region. According to one school of thought, Turkey is likely 
to remain close to the United States. For example, Lenore G. Martin argues “The 
realization that the Middle East was creating new risks and opportunities for its 
                                            
20 Sedat Laciner, “Mistrust Problem in Turkey-Iran Relation”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 




national security thrust Turkey into the pursuit of an activist foreign policy in the 
region in the last decade of the twentieth century. Yet the Republic relies on its 
U.S. alignment for long-term strategic security in NATO and to deter threats of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East”.22 Martin also adds that 
Turkey has some common economic interests with Iran, but on the other hand 
some conflicting political ones. Iran is a potential source of markets with its large 
population and a source of cheap oil and gas for Turkey. Thus, Turkey started to 
get Iranian gas in 2001 through a new pipeline as a result of 1996 long-term gas 
agreement negotiated despite U.S. opposition and violation of the 1996 Iran–
Libya Sanctions Act.23  
Turkey and Iran share the same concern about possible Kurdish 
independence in Iraq’s north but neither wants the other to be dominant in the 
region. Turkey also does not want Iraq to be under the dominance of Iran. Iran 
used the Kurdish card for a long time against Turkey, but recently developing 
Kurdish movements in Iran forced her to agree with Turkey. In addition, another 
big divergence between Turkey, which is a secular democracy, and Iran, which is 
an Islamic theocracy, is ideology. Turkey has accused Iran of trying to export its 
Islamic regime to Turkey and offering support for terrorist groups such as 
Hizbullah and the PKK. The Turkish armed forces have condemned Iran for 
helping injured PKK terrorists, providing them weapons, including SAM-7B air-
defense missiles, which were used to shoot down two Turkish helicopters in 
1997.24  
Another school of thought sees Ankara and Washington drifting apart. 
According to Ian O. Lesser, “Turkish–American relations since the 1960s have 
been characterized by recurring tensions, including widespread anti-
Americanism, arms embargoes, and disagreements over the Aegean, Kurds, 
                                            
22 Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keredis, “Turkey’s Middle East Foreign Policy”, The Future 
of Turkish Foreign Policy,(The MIT Press Cambridge, 2004), 157.  
23 Ibid., 172. 
24 Robert Olson, “Turkish-Iran relations, 1979-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and 
Geopolitics”, Mazda Publishers, 2003, 40. 
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northern Iraq, and the PKK”.25 Lesser also emphasizes that “the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) brought a new look to Turkey’s foreign policy, with 
more attention to the north, east, and south, which is needed for diversification 
and strategic depth. By design or circumstance, more of Turkey’s external policy 
energy is now devoted to relations with Russia, Iran, Syria, et al., and rather less 
to the maintenance of relations with Washington and Brussels”.26 But when we 
consider the help of Turkey from the very beginning of Turkish–American 
relations until now, including the AKP era, it looks like a heavy judgment. Even 
though it seemed like Turkey did not help the United States in the second Gulf 
War, even in the worst situation Turkey let the United States use their İncirlik 
base, which has been critical for the support of operations on the battlefield. 
Turkey opened up airfields and strategic logistics ways, which carry seventy-five 
percent of the materiel to support coalition operations in Iraq.27 There is anger 
toward Bush’s Middle-Eastern policies, not only in Turkey, but also in most of the 
European states, so disagreements over Iraq need not imply anything more 
about Turkey’s relationship to the United States than it does in the case of 
America’s European allies.   
According to Sedat Laciner, “Some right-wing Jewish groups in the U.S. 
see the AKP and al-Qaeda as identical. These groups characterize the governing 
AKP as ‘Islamist’ and claim that Turkey is leaning towards Islamism at the 
expense of Westernism”.28 But Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other members of the 
AKP have rejected this claim repeatedly, from the very first day of their 
government. Laciner also adds that during the AKP period, Turkey reached a 
historical peak of democratic reforms and the Turkish economy developed 
                                            
25 Ian O. Lesser, “The State of U.S.-Turkish Relations: Moving beyond Geopolitics”, in The 
Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, April 2008, 44. 
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ (accessed February 21, 2009). 
26 Ibid., 45.  
27 Ian O. Lesser, “The State of U.S.-Turkish Relations: Moving beyond Geopolitics”, in The 
Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, April 2008, 46-47 
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ (accessed February 21, 2009). 
28 Ibid. 
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dramatic integration with Western economies.29 Besides that, the many mutual 
agreements that were signed with Israel during the AKP government seem to be 
evidence against that perspective.  
Finally, Turkey’s cooperation with Iran seems difficult under present 
circumstances. According to Laciner, “Iran’s support to the PKK terrorist 
organization is still in memory. The intelligence reports clearly show that Teheran 
helped or ignored the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s. It is claimed that the PKK 
bases and other infrastructure around Kandil Mountain was constructed by the 
Iranians. Iran generally turned a blind eye to terror and the PKK terrorists freely 
crossed the border to attack Turkish forces during the 1990s”.30 After the United 
States invaded Iraq, the balance of power changed in the region. Iran started to 
be a target of the terrorism she used against Turkey for many years. “The PKK 
recently killed more than a hundred Iranian soldiers and police. The Kurdish 
problem in Iraq and other Iraqi problems threaten Iran too, and Iran seeks 
Turkey’s friendship over Iraq and the PKK problem. However, it is really difficult 
for the Turks to fully trust Iran in strategic issues. Past experiences and mixed 
signals from Teheran also do not help the Turks to rely on Iran”.31 
D. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
This study will rely on a combination of historical and policy analysis. Initial 
chapters will use historical research to analyze international relations among 
Turkey, the U.S., and Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution. The historical review 
focuses on Turkey’s bilateral relations with the United States and Iran, 
respectively, and stresses turning points in these relationships, which are 
important in understanding both today’s realities and future foreign-policy 
alternatives. The next part of the thesis will identify policy options for Turkey and 
                                            
29 Ian O. Lesser, “The State of U.S.-Turkish Relations: Moving beyond Geopolitics”, in The 
Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, April 2008, 46-47 




possible advantages and disadvantages. The thesis concludes with an 
assessment of these potential outcomes and recommendations for the future. In 
general, I will use the historical study method, but will also use case studies to 
emphasize events that brought about important shifts in foreign affairs. 
This study relies on data obtained through secondary sources such as 
books, journals, newspapers articles, and research-center reports. The next 
chapter in this thesis presents a review of Turkish-–U.S. relations in their 
historical context since 1979. The third chapter examines Turkish–Iranian 
relations in the same period. The fourth chapter examines the conflicting 
interests of Turkey, the United States, and Iran, with pros and cons for Turkey; 
the fifth chapter offers conclusions and recommendations. Turkey’s position 
between a neighbor and an old ally seems to be challenging, but for Turkey’s 
best interest Turkey should find a balance in her relations with her neighbors and 
with western allies and the United States.   
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II. TURKISH–AMERICAN RELATIONS 
This chapter is about the main events that shaped the background of 
Turkish-American relations which have been varied over time, but in an order. 
Turkey’s strategic location, unique democracy, devotion to modernization and 
credibility and reliability were important factors that made her a strong ally of the 
United States for a considerable period. Although there have been some 
diverging interests, generally both states realized the importance of each other 
and took measures needed to protect the alliance during the most strained times. 
In general Turkish-American relations provided many important advantages to 
both states from the very beginning. Turkey protected its territorial integrity 
against the increasing pressures of the Soviet Union, and received United States 
aid in order to develop its economy and military. On the other hand the United 
States contained the spread of the Soviet Communism, has used Turkish bases 
for power projection in the region to protect stability, and achieved Turkish 
support in many crisis all over the world. The common values of the United 
States and Turkey and their overlapping interests brought them into alliance from 
1940s to now. Both states mostly achieved their interests during this time. It is 
highly important for both states to protect and develop the relations which started 
to decline during Bush administration, and both sides should calculate and 
respect their interests reciprocally. 
A. THE COLD WAR 
Turkey was one of the lucky countries that were able to stay neutral during 
World War II. Under high pressure from both sides of the conflict to choose a 
side and join, Turkey’s determined stance against these pressures spared her 
the devastation of World War II. İsmet İnönü, the second president of the young 
Turkish Republic during World War II, was a wise and clever leader, having been  
an experienced soldier during the Turkish war of independence and a diplomat 
during the negotiations of Lausanne Agreement. He held Turkey safe in a circle 
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of fire during the deadliest war of human history. “Turkey entered World War II on 
the Allied side shortly before the war ended, becoming a charter member of the 
United Nations”.32  
Meanwhile, Iran tried to stay neutral, but after Germany invaded the Soviet 
Union, Iran’s strategic position forced Britain and the Soviet Union to invade Iran 
to create a path for British and American equipment support to the Soviet 
Union.33 “At the Tehran Conference, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill, and Prime Minister Josef Stalin reaffirmed a 
commitment to Iran's independence and territorial integrity and a willingness to 
extend economic assistance to Iran”.34 The United States and Britain withdrew 
their troops after the war but the Soviet Union did not do the same, instead 
requesting oil concessions from Iran and posing a danger to the stability of the 
region. Realizing the danger caused by the Soviet Union, the United States, 
Britain and the U.N. pressed the Soviet Union to withdraw her troops from Iran. 
Finally, with the strong posture of President Truman, Soviet troops left Iran in 
1946. Truman’s letter to his secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, discussed the 
increasing danger posed by the Soviet Union and her communist ideology.  
There is not a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of 
Turkey and the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless 
Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is 
in the making. ... I do not think we should play compromise any 
longer. ... I am tired of babying the Soviets.35 
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The implementation of the Truman Doctrine is generally accepted as the 
beginning of the Cold War. The duty of supporting Greece and Turkey from the 
danger of spreading communism was not within the financial capability of Britain. 
The United States was the only power that could have done this in favor of her 
interests in the region to contain the spread of communism. “Truman justified his 
request on two grounds. He argued that a communist victory in the Greek civil 
war would endanger the political stability of Turkey, which would undermine the 
political stability of the Middle East. This could not be allowed in light of the 
region's immense strategic importance to U.S. national security”.36 Realizing the 
need to help not only European states, the United States started to support 
Greece and Turkey economically and militarily under the Marshall Plan.  
Turkey continued to support the U.S. Cold War strategy not only in the 
Middle East but also in other parts of the World by contributing troops, as in the 
Korean War, which took place six thousand miles away from Turkey. By 
contributing fifteen-thousand soldiers to this war, Turkey showed and proved her 
willingness to be a member of the Western nations, which was the main purpose 
of the new Turkish republic and its founder Kemal Ataturk, and achieved a 
chance to be a member of NATO, which was established by Western countries 
against the threat of Soviet communism. As Ertugrul Kurkcu stated, “Participation 
in the Korean War sealed with blood Turkey's baptism as a ‘Western nation’ in 
the global realignment of forces”.37  
As Boyer and Katulis observe, “Turkey’s entrance into NATO—the 
alliance’s first expansion of significance—was designed as a buffer against 
Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf region. At the time, Turkey’s role was 
largely to maintain pressure on the Eastern Bloc’s southern flank in the event of 
                                            
36 U.S. Department of State, “The Truman Doctrine, 1947”, 
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war with the Soviet Union”.38 After becoming a member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, Turkey always has been an important 
security partner for the United States. “Ankara tied down 24 Soviet divisions that 
otherwise could have been deployed against NATO forces on the Central Front. 
Turkey also provided important installations for monitoring and verifying Soviet 
compliance with arms-control agreements”.39 
Turkey allowed the United States to build a base in Adana in 1951. Adana 
Air Base was finished in 1954 and an agreement was signed between the 
Turkish General Staff and the United States Air Force about the joint use of this 
new base.40 Its first official name “Adana Air Base (AB) later started to be known 
as Incirlik Common Defense Installation and on 28 February 1958 its name was 
changed to Incirlik Air Base”.41 “The U.S. Air Force initially planned to use the 
base as an emergency staging and recovery site for medium and heavy 
bombers. The following years would prove the value of Incirlik's location, not only 
in countering the Soviet threat, but also in responding to crises in the Middle 
East”.42 The United States has used this base in many operations, such as 
reconnaissance missions against the Soviet Union, the Lebanon crisis in 1958, 
the first Gulf War, humanitarian relief operations, the second Gulf War, the war 
on terrorism in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, and many minor missions. The 
following figure depicts the importance of Incirlik Air Base. 
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Figure 5.   Geographical importance of the Incirlik Air Base43 
The United States deployed nuclear weapons all over the Europe as a 
countermeasure against the threat of the Soviet communism.44 “In 1959, Ankara 
permitted the American Jupiter missiles to launch from its soil. Turkey, as the first 
Muslim country to have recognized Israel, has proved to be a significant and 
viable partner for the American Middle East policy determined by the Eisenhower 
Doctrine”.45 
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Figure 6.   American Nuclear Weapons in Europe  
In the 1950s, the United States was seeking to establish an alliance 
structure in the Middle East as another countermeasure against the communist 
threat. “The idea was to conclude an alliance that would link the southernmost 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey, with the 
westernmost member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 
Pakistan”.46 Turkey participated in the Baghdad Pact in 1955 alongside Iraq, 
Iran, Pakistan, and Britain to prevent communist incursions and foster peace in 
the Middle East. The organization was renamed as the Central Treaty 
Organization, or CENTO, in 1959 after Iraq left.47   
There are two important disappointments that caused some decline in the 
relationship between Turkey and the United States in the 1960s. The first was 
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The American U-2 reconnaissance pilot Major 
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Richard Heyser took photos of Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 14, 1962.48 
The Soviet Union used her missiles as a bargaining trump against the American 
Jupiter missiles in Turkey. “Reciprocal removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey 
and Soviet missiles from Cuba was proposed by the Soviets. Although the U.S. 
administration refused to confirm such a deal, the Kennedy administration 
unilaterally removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963”.49 Şükrü Elekdağ 
who was the Turkish ambassador to Washington between 1979 and 1989 
emphasized that Turkey had no information about the bargaining between the 
two superpowers during the crisis.50 “Though they would have been superseded 
by the submarine-based Polaris missiles in any case, the Jupiter missiles 
experience was a salutary reminder of the asymmetrical nature of the Turkish–
American alliance, and has not been forgotten by Turkey’s foreign policy and 
security elites”.51  
The second strain between Turkey and the United States took place when 
President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü to prevent a 
possible Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1964. President Johnson was warning 
about the danger of a Soviet response to a Turkish military intervention to Cyprus 
and declaring to Prime Minister İnonü not to look for automatic NATO protection 
in such a situation. Furthermore, he warned İnonü not to propose using U.S. 
military equipment if such an intervention happened.52 The Turkish government 
was dissatisfied because of strained relations with the United States and started 
to revise its relations with the Soviet Union as a response. In 1965, the Turkish 
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foreign minister visited Moscow and the Soviet Union recognized two different 
nations on the island of Cyprus. In 1966, Turkey asked for a review of the ninety-
one bilateral agreements between Turkey and the United States and restricted 
the priviliges given to American bases and personnel.53  
The worst decline in Turkish–American relations occurred after the 1974 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus. After the failure of a long period of diplomatic efforts 
to find a solution to Greek Cypriot attacks against Turkish Cypriots, Turkey 
moved unilaterally to protect peace on the island as one of three guarantor 
states. On July 15, 1974, the Greek dictators staged a coup in Cyprus, and five 
days later Turkey invaded the north of the island.54 The United States Congress 
condemned the invasion and imposed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 
until 1978. As a response, “Turkey has annulled the Bilateral Defense and 
Cooperation Agreement and halted all foreign military base activities excepting 
the ones in the framework of the NATO purposes, over all Turkey”.55 
According to Larrabee, “Turks regarded the embargo as a slap in the face 
of a loyal ally, so the embargo led to a sharp deterioration of U.S.–Turkish 
relations. It is still remembered with bitterness and colors contemporary Turkish 
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Even though the relations were highly strained due to the U.S. arms 
embargo, the United States fully lifted the embargo in 1978 just before losing 
another ally in the region, Iran.57 In 1980, Turkey and the United States signed 
the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), in which Turkey 
gave permission to the U.S. to use its airfields and intelligence facilities. In return, 
Turkey achieved U.S. economic support and assistance in modernizing the 
Turkish military.58 “Turkey also purchased fighter jets (F-16s) from the U.S. and 
co-produced F-16s with the U.S. based on the Defense and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement”.59 
The Motherland Party of Turgut Özal, who was an ultra pro-American 
politician with strong religious tendencies, won the general elections in 1983.60 
“He was willing to come across with constitutional institutions in order to 
implement even more pro-American policies.”61 Özal supported and wanted to 
participate in the American occupation of Iraq in 1991, but was halted by the 
resignation of his chief of staff, Necip Torumtay, and the strong oppositon of the 
foreign-affairs ministry.62   
In this context, Turkey and the United States worked well enough to 
protect their interests in the region. “Although there were episodic problems in 
U.S.–Turkish relations, for much of the Cold War, Turkey was a major recipient of 
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U.S. economic and military assistance”.63 In return, the United States used 
Turkey’s alliance and military bases in many crises, operations, and policies 
towards region.  
B. AFTER THE COLD WAR 
1. 1991 Gulf War  
The end of the Cold War caused significant changes for a Turkey that had 
stood at the forefront against the threat of communism for many years as an 
American ally. “The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union forced Turkey to redefine and reshape its foreign policy in important ways. 
Initially many Turks feared that the end of the Cold War would diminish Turkey’s 
strategic importance. These fears, however, proved to be unfounded. Turkey’s 
strategic importance has increased, not decreased, as a result of the end of the 
Cold War”.64  
Turkish–American relations started to intensify especially after the 1990s, 
when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. This event triggered a sequence of 
events that encouraged Turkey to increase relations with the United States but 
be more suspicious about the American policies in the region. From then on, 
Turkey followed contradictory policies back and forth between protecting its 
territorial integrity and protecting the relations with the United States.65  
Turkey proved the geopolitical importance of itself and the territories it is 
sitting on after the 1990s, when the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, sent the Iraqi 
armed forces to invade Kuwait and capture her oil fields. The Turkish president, 
Turgut Özal, cut off the Kirkuk–Yumurtalik oil pipeline from Iraq and gave 
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sanction to the coalition forces to strike Iraq from Turkey during operation Desert 
Storm, although it brought a high economic cost and raised the risk of Iraqi 
military action towards Turkey.66 Turkey opened its most important bases, such 
as Incirlik, Batman, Mus, and some others for the use of coalition forces, and 
Turkish forces offered vital assistance by tying down Iraqi forces in the north of 
Iraq.67 “Many officials in the United States emphasized the increased importance 
of Turkey. Some have even argued that Turkey’s role in the new era could be as 
important as Germany’s during the Cold War”.68 
Turkey played another important role, and bore the economic results of 
this role again, after Operation Desert Storm, by giving permission to use Turkish 
bases for Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Northern Watch, which were 
planned and conducted to protect Kurds from the rage of Saddam Hussein. 
“Provide Comfort Operation strained Turkey's economy in ways it could not 
absorb. Initially, Ankara had to care for the Kurdish refugees. Turks complained 
that they were being asked single-handedly to rectify the plight of these people. 
With the world watching (via CNN), Turkey could hardly turn its back on this 
problem”.69  
President Bush worked on some type of assistance to ease Turkey’s 
situation by economic aids, supporting Turkey’s full membership in the European 
Economic Community, supporting the idea of an American opening to the former 
Soviet Republics with Turkey and even endorsing Turkey’s position on Cyprus. 
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However, President Bush was voted out of office just after Desert Storm and his 
last $543 million aid request for Turkey to Congress was cut to $450 million and 
converted into loans.70  
Turkey and the United States were in mutual understanding regarding the 
terrorist organization PKK once the Cold War was over. Both states agreed that 
PKK terrorism had become a major destabilizing threat in the region and 
presented a danger to Turkish national security. Thus, Washington and Ankara 
regarded the response of Turkey to PKK terrorism as legitimate self defense, not 
only in southeastern Turkey, but also in Iraq’s north, and considered it in 
accordance with international law. However, the Turkish government did not 
agree with some important U.S. assumptions and solution proposals related to 
the problem.71 Nevertheless, the PKK found a safe heaven in the north of Iraq, 
indirectly under the protection of coalition operations that created an uncontrolled 
region in the north of Iraq next to Turkish borders.  
In addition to this, Turkey has never been compensated for its economic 
losses during and after Gulf War I. “Before the imposition of UN sanctions, Iraq 
was Turkey’s third largest trade partner and its largest oil supplier. Turkey would 
like to see this trade restored”.72 However, later developments in Iraq always 
postponed Turkey’s wishes and dragged the situation into a worse condition.  
These harmful experiences became some of the most criticized issues 
about American policies among the society and elites of Turkey and have never 
been forgotten. These events became the roots of increasing anti-American 
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ideas among the people in Turkey. The United States started to be blamed for 
any problem related to Iraq and posing danger to Turkish interests, especially 
increasing PKK terrorism and economic difficulties.  
2. 1 March Draft Crisis 
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade 
Center became a turning point in post–Cold War world politics. Turkey, as a 
country that has been fighting against terrorism for more than twenty years, was 
one of the states that immediately condemned the terrorist attacks and provided 
full support to the United States as it declared war on terrorism and started its 
first operation in Afghanistan. Turkey agreed to send troops to Afghanistan and 
stood with the United States on related issues. “On November 2, in response to 
Washington’s request for assistance, ninety Turkish special-forces operators 
deployed to Afghanistan, where they provided technical assistance to the 
northern alliance”.73 Turkey played other important roles in Afghanistan, 
especially after the Taliban regime was toppled. Turkey stationed a contingent of 
825 troops in Afghanistan and has twice led the NATO international security-
assistance force.74  
At the same time, Turkey had a cautious foreign policy concerning Iraq, 
which was directly related with Turkey’s security and regional stability. As a 
neighbor of Iraq, Turkey bore the burden of the first Gulf War in many areas and 
was faced with concerns ranging from economics and security to stability and 
territorial integrity. According to Steven Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood, “Ankara 
argues that the international isolation of Iraq, which prior to the first Gulf War was 
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Turkey’s largest trading partner, cost the Turkish treasury an estimated $35 
billion and damaged the local economy of the region bordering Iraq—one of the 
most underdeveloped in Turkey”.75  
Besides this, the possibility of the emergence of an independent Kurdish 
state in the north of Iraq and the future of oil-rich city Kirkuk were declared as 
“the red line” of Turkey even though “Paul Wolfowitz said that ‘a separate Kurdish 
state in the north would be destabilizing to Turkey and would be unacceptable to 
the United States’”.76 Thus, Turkey was unwilling to see a second war on her 
borders, which could push Turkey in to more severe conditions. Instead, Turkey 
as always, was in favor of political solutions to protect stability. According to Prof. 
Nasuh Uslu, “The general Turkish view on Iraq is that Iraq's independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity should be preserved and Iraq should comply 
fully with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. While the U.S. remains 
focused on removing Saddam from power and challenges Iraq's territorial 
integrity with its policies, Turkey does not want to see Iraq destroyed and divided, 
fearing that this would destabilize the balance of power in the region and 
contribute to the expansion of the Iranian influence”.77 
Even though Turkey was in a massive election process and had many 
concerns and questions about the Iraqi policies of the U.S., the new AKP 
government (with its inexperienced ministers) and general staff were both in 
favor of supporting the U.S. if security and economic losses would be 
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compensated. The Turkish government accepted a first request about 
modernization of Turkish bases and facilities for use by the United States, and 
U.S. military personnel started to work on those sites.  
The AK Party government prepared a motion that would cover a 
period of six months on March 1, 2003, which sought permission to 
deploy Turkish troops in Iraq and to allow U.S. troops to use 
Turkish soil for deployment in Iraq. The motion was rejected in 
Parliament because it failed to receive the vote of the absolute 
majority as suggested by Article 96 of the Constitution. Out of the 
533 deputies, who attended the voting, 250 of them voted against 
the passage for the motion while 264 deputies voted in favor of it; 
19 deputies cast a blank vote.78  
Turkey and the United States could not agree about opening a northern 
front, but Turkey opened its airspace to the United States “on March 19 and 
authorized U.S. access to eleven Turkish air corridors for six months. Turkey’s air 
space was used by armed Tomahawk missiles, U.S. Navy B-2 bombers, and 
U.S. planes that airlifted the 173rd Airborne Brigade paratroopers who jumped 
into northern Iraq”.79  
According to Prof. Ilter Turan, there were several reasons for Turkey’s 
failure to respond to U.S. requests. 
The Turkish public was clearly against such involvement. There 
were also disagreements among various branches of government. 
The president was insistent on a UN resolution, the opposition party 
was adamant in its resistance; the government party was divided 
within itself and could not get its deputies and even some ministers 
in the cabinet to vote for it. The military while supportive of the 
resolution had abstained from strong public statements in its favor 
in order to prevent the government from blaming the military for 
dragging Turkey into Iraq. The decision appears not so much the 
result of deliberate policies to say no to the U.S. but a failure on the 
part of the government to mobilize sufficient support for the 
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resolution to pass. The foot-dragging on the part of the Turkish 
government was often a result of uncertainty about how much their 
party would back them and an unrealistic optimism that somehow 
Saddam might be persuaded to change his course.80  
3. The U.S. Invasion of Iraq 
The United States invaded Iraq in order to topple Saddam Hussein, who 
was alleged to have weapons of mass destruction, in March 2003, without a UN 
resolution or a northern Turkish front. The Turkish Grand National Assembly’s 
rejection of opening a northern front and stationing American troops in Turkey 
strained relations on both states. For Turkey, the worst scenario about the 
American invasion of Iraq was its strategically dangerous results which would 
directly affect Turkey and other regional states in one way or another. “Indeed, 
said Dogu Ergil, head of an independent research institute, the war to oust the 
Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, ‘ended up with the United States becoming 
Turkey's neighbor’ as the de facto ruler of Iraq, opposed to any Turkish military 
adventure that might set off a new conflict with the region's Kurds”.81 
Kurds were already enjoying regional autonomy since the 1991 Gulf War 
under the protection of the United States, Britain, and Turkey. Turkey’s refusal of 
the American request for a northern front became another invaluable chance for 
Kurds to move alongside the United States and await their reward after the war. 
Turkey was being harshly criticized by hawkish American politicians about 
increasing American casualties due to the lack of a northern front.  
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According to Zalmay Khalilzad, “Turks fear that U.S. efforts to topple 
Saddam could destabilize Iraq and lead to the creation of an independent 
Kurdish state on Turkey’s border”.82 Khalilzad’s assessment and the fear of 
Turkey came out to be true. The Kurds fought against Saddam with the United 
States and managed to have a seat at the table after Saddam. Jalal Talabani 
became the new president of Iraq, and Mesoud Barzani became the president of 
the de facto independent Kurdish region in the north of Iraq. In October 2005, 
President George Bush welcomed Barzani, who was in his traditional clothes, to 
the White House as the “president of the Kurdish region”.83 After this 
development “the charge d'affaires for the U.S. embassy, Nancy McEldowney, 
was called to the foreign ministry, where Turkish Undersecretary Nabi Şensoy 
formally asked her to explain ‘whose president’ Barzani was welcomed as at the 
White House. Şensoy reportedly passed on a warning to McEldowney that such 
practices threatened the unity of Iraq. The official U.S. reply to the events was, ‘... 
Barzani carries the title of ‘President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.’ This is why 
Bush referred to him as 'president.' President Bush spoke directly to Barzani 
about Turkey's sensitivity towards Iraq's geographic and political unity.”84 This 
looks like an ironic controversy, but the truth is a big change took place in the 
picture of Iraq after invasion, but not in favor of the Turkish–American relations. 
These persons were the leaders of two Kurdish tribes until the invasion of Iraq 
and now they became presidents. Iraq was divided between three ethnic groups, 
Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, and a rally began to control more territories by means 
of force.  
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Even though “The U.S. government guaranteed that Kurds would not 
enter Kirkuk or Mosul”,85 Kurds looted the government land-registration offices of 
oil-rich Kirkuk and burned all land deeds, birth registries, records, and titles of 
those territories and started a planned immigration of Kurds from various areas of 
Iraq to Kirkuk to change the demography in favor of themselves.86 Turkey 
watched the developments carefully and President Abdullah Gül and Prime 
Minister Erdogan, warned Iraqi Kurdish groups against trying to seize control of 
Kirkuk. He said Turkey would not stand by amid growing ethnic tensions, 
prompting accusations of interference by Iraqi Kurds.87 Turkey repeatedly stated 
the historical importance of the city of Kirkuk, which should not become a 
destabilizing factor and should stay under the control of all Iraqis. According to 
the late historian Hanna Batatu, "Kirkuk had been Turkish through and through in 
the not too distant past … [but] by degrees, Kurds moved into the city from the 
surrounding villages … By 1959, they had swollen to more than one-third of the 
population, and the Turkomans had declined to just over half. While the Kurds 
‘Kurdified’ Irbil, Kirkuk retained a greater sense of’ cultural links with Turkey… 
[and] ethnic identity".88 Turkish officials warned that Kurds would use the oil 
revenues of Kirkuk to prepare for a fight for their independence. Ankara 
requested Washington to make two changes to the Iraqi constitution to prevent 
this grave development. First, a Kirkuk referendum about the administrative and 
geographic status of Kirkuk must include all Iraqis and second, Ankara wanted 
the referendum delayed two years.89 Turkish intelligence found out that “Barzani, 
who is the leader of Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (IKDP), sent money in the 
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amount of $500,000 to former Iraqi Justice Minister Hashim El Shebli. The 
documents carried by Turkish Special Representative to Iraq, Celikkol appear to 
show that Barzani offered bribes to various Iraqi officials to oversee new laws 
offering compensation to ethnic Arabs who would leave the northern Iraqi city of 
Kirkuk”.90  
Two acts of American carelessness disturb the Turkish side concerning 
the Iraqi invasion. “First, in the run-up to the war, Washington summarily 
dismissed Ankara’s warnings about the consequences of invading Iraq. Second, 
as events have confirmed Turkey’s grave misgivings about the war, Turks 
believe the United States has not taken sufficient care to address Turkey’s 
security concerns”.91 This situation creates an idea in the minds of both Turkish 
intellectuals and ordinary Turkish citizens that the United States does not support 
Turkey in its struggle with the PKK but supports an independent Kurdistan.  
Turks as a people are very sensitive about some issues and soldiers’ 
security is at the top of the list. Turks have been proud of their soldiers from the 
beginning of their history, and the Turkish army is based on a draft by which 
every twenty-year-old has a duty to serve. This means that every Turkish man 
serves in the armed forces once in his life, and every family has at least one 
family member in the army, considering its 450,000 soldiers. Thus, every Turkish 
soldier killed by the PKK terrorists of Iraq’s north, which is under American 
control, increases animosity towards U.S. policies; and consequently, anti-
Americanism in Turkey has increased to levels never seen before.92  
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Despite Turkey and America’s deep divergence about the invasion of Iraq, 
both states were aware of their mutual importance. Thus, as U.S. Deputy 
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said in 2004, “regardless of Ankara’s views of 
U.S. policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey remained a very strong ally in the 
fight against terrorism”.93 Turkey became the most important life-vein supporting 
American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Incirlik Airbase became the most 
important logistics center for United States troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. After a 
disagreement between Washington and Ankara about the Armenian resolution, 
“Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates warned about the ‘enormous implications’ 
for American military operations in Iraq if Turkey limited flights over its territory or 
restricted access to Incirlik Air Base through where seventy percent of the 
military cargo sent to Iraq is flown.94 
All I can say is that a resolution that looks back almost a hundred 
years to an event that took place under a predecessor government, 
the Ottomans, and that has enormous present-day implications for 
American soldiers and Marines and sailors and airmen in Iraq, is 
something we need to take very seriously.95 
Turkey as an ally of the United States in hard times always stood with her 
in many crises. Today the United States again needs Turkey’s help in a safe and 
successful withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. “The ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AK Party) government is not against the withdrawal of U.S. 
land forces from Iraq via Turkey and wants the U.S. administration to set an 
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discussed the prospects of withdrawing U.S. troops first through northern Iraq 
and then transferring them to Adana and İskenderun through the Habur border 
gate”.96 
Turkey’s requests concerning Iraq are simple and deal with the most 
important problem between the two allies since 2003. First, Ankara wants 
Washington to be more active against PKK terrorism and to put pressure on 
Mesoud Barzani not turn a blind eye to PKK enclaves, to forbid all actions of the 
PKK, and to hand over leaders of the terrorist organization to Turkey. Second, 
Turkey wants to protect the integrity of Iraq, which takes first place in the list of 
security concerns and has lethal importance for Turkey’s future. Thus, Iraqi unity 
seems to be the main issue in Turkish–American relations.  
4. The Sacking Crisis 
Turkish–American relations were damaged in March 2003 by the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly’s veto of a northern front to Iraq from Turkey. Before its 
effects could die down, “another tension between Turkey and the United States 
over Iraq were heightened in July 2003 when reports surfaced that eleven 
Turkish Special Forces officers and others were detained for allegedly attempting 
to assassinate Kurdish political figures”.97 This crisis became one of the most 
important indicators of the derailed relations between Turkey and the United 
States. According to former the Turkish ambassador to the United States, Nuzhet 
Kandemir, “This crisis, the incident during which American soldiers ambushed a 
number of Turkish special forces and put sacks over their heads, referred to as 
‘the sacking incident,’ created an unacceptable situation for the Turkish 
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people”.98 Turkish General Staff described the event as “the biggest crisis of trust 
between Turkish and U.S. forces.” “For some sixty hours, it led to an 
unprecedented blockade of one NATO country's facilities by another”.99 
According to Nuzhet Kandemir, “This act was not at all compatible with 
friendship and alliance. Kurdish actors in Iraq played an active role in this 
incident, which was perceived by the Turkish public as a conscious effort to take 
revenge on Turkey for the 1 March 2003 parliamentary action”.100 This crisis 
created another trust problem between the United States and Turkey. According 
to Soner Cagaptay, “Many in Ankara believe that the United States is trying to set 
up a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and many in Washington are convinced that 
Turkey is aiming to complicate things there for the United States. Accordingly, 
little trust can be found today between American and Turkish troops, especially 
those stationed in Iraq”.101  
This crisis affected all levels of Turkish society, causing a deep negative 
attitude towards the United States and remaining for a long time the most 
important item on the agenda in Turkey. The movie “Valley of the Wolves: Iraq,” 
which was prepared as a response to the sacking crisis, became an important 
indicator of increasing anti-American attitude of the society and it became the 
most popular film of the year by breaking all box-office records within days of 
release. Even though both states declared that the event was a mistake and 
apologized to each other, the social effects of the “humiliation,” which touched a 
delicate nerve among Turkish elites and citizens, still can be felt. 
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5. Different Priorities for the United States and Turkey  
According to the Hudson Institute senior fellow Zeyno Baran, “The 
fundamental problem for U.S.-Turkey relations is that the threat perceptions of 
Washington and Ankara have changed considerably since 9/11. For the U.S., the 
primary threat is al-Qaeda terrorism. While Saddam Hussein was considered a 
primary threat for some time, Iran and now Syria are increasingly viewed in this 
light—as are Hamas and Hizbullah. For Turkey, the primary threats are the PKK, 
instability in and outside Turkey, the independence of Kurdistan or the splitting of 
Iraq into three sections (whether by ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ partition)”.102 These different 
priorities have been dragging the longtime allies towards different directions in 
the name of national interests.  
Iraq’s future is one of the most important and troubled topics in Turkish–
American relations since 1991 Gulf War, but especially after the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. Although Turkey fully supported the first Gulf War in 1991 and 
rapidly went along with the U.S. in Afghanistan, in 2003 Turkey opposed the 
invasion of Iraq for several important reasons. These reasons continued to be of 
utmost importance after the U.S. invasion, and still are.  
The situation in Iraq did not progress in the way Turkey wished and 
Turkey and the United States had agreed on before. The United States gave its 
attention to stability in Iraq and supported the relatively stable north and Kurdish 
region for the sake of protecting and improving stability. On the Turkish side, the 
decreasing influence in the north of Iraq was once more confirmed with the 
Kurdish victory in the 26 May elections in Kirkuk, which were organized and 
controlled by the United States. This action of restricting the rights of Turkmen in 
Kirkuk by the United States showed to the Turks that the U.S. did not pay any 
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attention to the 28 February agreement, in which Turkey declared its sensitivities 
and priorities about Kirkuk and Turkmen living in Kirkuk, signed between Turkey 
and the United States.103  
Turkey suffered the most pain, damage, and economic loss, after Iraq 
itself, from Iraq’s instability. Turkey has been fighting terrorists who launch their 
attacks from bases in Iraq, where the central government lost its ability to control 
the whole state after the U.S. invasion. Kurdish groups, who are being supported 
by the United States in return their help in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, are not 
moving against the PKK terrorists and the U.S. pressure on them seemed 
fruitless until President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki signed a protocol for the 
withdrawing of the U.S. troops.  
After the date of withdrawal of the United States became known, the 
Kurdish groups in the north of Iraq started to look for friendly relations with 
Turkey. In this picture, the Shia groups can develop their relations with Iran and 
the Sunnis probably will develop their relations with Sunni Arab states, but the 
Kurds will stay alone in an unfriendly environment. This scenario seems to be 
accepted by the Kurds in Iraq, especially after the Arab 12th Division’s move to 
Kirkuk.104 After these developments, it does not seem to me by chance that they 
hosted the annual Abant meeting platform in Erbil and started talk about 
friendship, brotherhood, and peaceful futures waiting for both sides. They forgot 
their provocative statements about not being willing to give to Turkey “PKK 
terrorists and even a Kurdish cat”, which was mentioned by Celal Talabani, to 
Turkey. 
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To conclude, there are some important issues between Turkey and the 
United States on which both states should agree and find a common way which 
can meet the needs of both states. The stability and unity of Iraq, Nabucco 
energy line, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, cooperation on the war on terror which 
mostly means PKK for Turkey and Al Qaeda for the United States, Turkish 
permission for the use of its bases by the United States for future needs, the 
United States’ support to Turkey’s accession to the EU, and removing the 
isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and other economic issues 
are the main drivers that force both states to cooperate in these areas in order to 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41
III. TURKISH–IRANIAN RELATIONS 
Turkish-Iranian relations have been generally characterized by rivalry 
during history. Being on neighboring territories has forced both states to struggle 
for power in favor of themselves and this became the main reason of tension 
between these two neighboring states with completely different cultures. The 
Iranian states became the most important representative of the Shiite sect and 
the Turkish state of the Sunni sect. This difference generally has been a source 
of distrust between both states. One of the main issues between both states is 
the ambitions of Iran about spreading its regime to the neighboring states and 
controlling them. Iran has been in a struggle to spread the Shiite sect among the 
Turks living in Turkey and tried different methods including terror to achieve its 
goal. Iran also supported the PKK terrorism for a long time and provided shelter, 
training, weapons and medical needs for them.  
A. DURING THE COLD WAR 
1. Before the Islamic Revolution 
Turks and Iranians are the oldest residents of their territories in the Middle 
East. There is a long background between these two nations and the states that 
were established by them. However, Turks and Iranians have struggled to be the 
hegemon of the Middle East and to control this geography since the Çaldıran 
Battle in 1514 between Yavuz Sultan Selim and Shah Ismail, both of whom were 
Turks but Muslims of different sects.105 This struggle for domination caused 
many tensions and crises in their long neighborhood relations, but they 
preserved their cultures and societies up to now without one surrendering to the 
other. The mistrust and fear of being dominated that are byproducts of the long 
struggle between Turks and Iranians have survived as long as relations have 
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gone on and have never disappeared.106 At the beginning of the 20th century, 
although Sunni–Shiite sectarian differences seemed to lose importance in the 
bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran, they still lie in the subconscious of 
the both states and their people.107   
Turkey and Iran had similar fortunes during their establishment period at 
the beginning of the 20th century and during the Cold War. “Reza Khan’s coup in 
Tehran, in February 1921, marked the beginning of a new period in the history of 
Turkish–Iranian relations. At roughly the same time, in both countries, two 
nationalist, anti-imperialist, and open-minded soldiers, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) 
and Reza Khan/Shah struggled against enemies both internal and external”.108 
Despite these similarities, mistrust remained.  “Although Reza Khan supported 
Atatürk’s modernization policies, he was concerned that the Turkish Republic 
was simply a continuation of the Committee of Union and Progress and as such, 
was a pan-Turkic structure; it is for this reason that he adopted anti-Turkish 
policies in Iran”.109 
These two southern neighbors of the Soviet Union were under the 
pressure of communist threat during the Cold War. The Soviet Union was 
unwilling to pull its troops back after World War II finished, although they agreed 
to do so with the United States and Britain before invading Iran. In addition to 
that, the Soviet Union requested oil-concession agreements with the Iranian 
government and used the Azeri Turks and Kurds as a threat against the integrity 
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of Iran.110 On the other hand, Turkey was being threatened and pressured about 
rearrangement of the control of the Turkish Straits in favor of the Soviet Union 
and giving the cities of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union. Turkey and Iran 
looked for the alliance of the West and the United States to prevent the Soviet 
threat. Thus, Turkish–Iranian relations continued to be friendly and strengthened 
by regional alliances such as Bagdad Pact (later named CENTO) in 1955 and 
Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964.111  
“Iran and Turkey were the only Muslim states which recognized the state 
of Israel immediately after its establishment in 1948. As non-Arab and as pro-
Western states in the Middle East, they were isolated to a certain extent by Arab 
countries, which intensified their efforts to seek support from the Western 
powers”.112 According to Cetinsaya in the 1960s and 1970s, several issues 
created new tensions between Turkey and Iran. These issues were:  
First, the Shah continued to express his dissatisfactions regarding 
CENTO, despite efforts by post-1963 governments in Ankara, 
especially the Demirel governments from 1965 onwards, to placate 
him in this regard.  
Second, Turkish public opinion, and especially the growing left, 
became increasingly critical of the shah’s dictatorship. The critical 
language of the Turkish press toward the regime in Iran was a 
source of irritation to the Shah.  
Third, a large number of Iranian dissident students living in Turkey 
received support from the Turkish left.  
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Fourth, Turkey was anxious about the shah’s support of Iraqi Kurds 
and repeatedly warned him concerning the possible results of such 
support for both Turkey and Iran itself. At a time when Iraqi–Turkish 
relations were progressing rapidly, and inevitably straining relations 
between Iran and Turkey, Ankara tried several times to mediate 
between Baghdad and Tehran on the issue of the Shatt al-Arab 
river forming part of their border.  
Fifth, Turkey was apprehensive about the shah’s attempt to 
establish patronage over Turkish Kurds and Alevis; the Turkish 
authorities believed that he had sent emissaries to the Kurdish and 
Alevi regions of Anatolia.113 
Iran gave up its claims on Bahrain through a secret deal with Britain, in 
exchange for invading the three disputed islands, Great- and Lesser Tunbs and 
Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf, in 1970. However, the Shah’s aggressive policies 
and ambitions disturbed both Iraq and Turkey.114  
Turkey was in a difficult situation economically during the 1973 oil crisis, 
politically during the 1974 Cyprus crisis and militarily with the U.S. arms 
embargo. On the other hand, Iran became a rich, militarily strong, and 
strategically important country in regional politics.115 “Although the Shah, 
expressing his concern to Washington, was critical of the arms embargo and 
supported the Turkish cause in Cyprus, he was nevertheless content with the 
change in the relative power situation between Turkey and Iran, and sought to 
turn it to his advantage”116 and did not accept the Turkish request for cheap oil. 
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2. After the Islamic Revolution 
There has always been a regime problem between Turkey and Iran. This 
problem revolved around the differences between their monarchic and republican 
systems after 1924. The regime differences between Turkey and Iran turned into 
complete opposition after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Iran changed its 
structure according to the rules of Sheri ‘a.117 Although the general idea about 
the revolution was that it would deeply damage Turkish–Iranian relations due to 
their completely opposite political mentalities, it did not come true.118 “Contrary to 
expectation, the same patterns of conflict and collaboration in relations continued 
as ever, and reached a peak especially in the field of trade, compared with the 
shah period”.119  
The identity definition has generally been the basic factor in the 
determination of Turkish–Iranian relations. Turkey started its westernization 
struggles at the end of Ottoman era and is still struggling to westernize. Thus, 
Turkey has always defined itself as a Western state and tried to reach the 
standards of developed states, which are generally Western states, especially 
after Kemal Ataturk established the Turkish republic. However, Iran started to 
define itself with an Eastern identity and saw Western culture as an evil danger 
after the revolution.120    
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According to Kibaroglu, there are contrary forces at work in the 
relationship between Turkey and Iran:  
The 1979 Islamic revolution shook the stability of Turkish–Iranian 
relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s militant Islamist statements 
and foreign policy fuelled tension and mutual distrust. However, 
both countries sought to prevent conflict or a rupture in relations. 
This reluctance to escalate the tensions stemmed largely from their 
desire to protect their economic interests, given that Turkey was an 
exporter of goods to Iran and Iran was a major energy supplier for 
Turkey.121 
The Islamic-revolution supporters increased their demonstrations and 
attacks in big cities such as Tehran, Mashad, Tabriz and Qum in the late 1970s 
and the revolutionary transformation gained momentum in Iran. Turkey was 
concerned about a possible Soviet intervention or communist takeover in Iran, 
which would put Turkey’s security interests in danger.122 Although concerned 
about the Soviet threat, “The Turkish government preferred neutrality toward 
Iran’s internal conflict. Politicians consciously refrained from any clear declaration 
of support for the Shah in his difficulties”.123  
Islamic revolution succeeded in 1979, and Turkey instantaneously 
recognized the new administration as the legitimate regime and declared its 
desire to develop relations in the new era. “In his message to Tehran, Ecevit 
stressed the importance of preserving good bilateral relations and Turkey’s 
intention not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs. He advised ‘other countries to 
do the same,’ a point aimed at the Soviet Union but also applying to the United 
States”.124 
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According to Cetinsaya there were several reasons for Turkey’s 
acceptance and recognition of the new regime from the outset and refusal to 
intervene:  
First, the Ecevit government, as a continuation of its foreign and 
domestic policy, had already been critical of the shah and the 
CENTO alliance. They were therefore pleased with an 
‘independent’ and non-aligned’ Iran.  
Secondly, the Turkish military and political elite, just as after the 
FWW and the SWW, were apprehensive about the disintegration of 
Iran as result of a civil war. In that case, a Kurdish separatist 
movement would rise or the Soviets would take control of Iran. 
Turkey therefore closely observed the policy of the new regime 
towards the Kurdish disturbances in Iran, following the revolution.  
Thirdly, a weakened and isolated revolutionary Iran would be a 
good trading partner for Turkey’s bankrupt economy. Last but not 
least, Turkey was pleased to see that Iran had lost its prestige, 
power, and capacity in regional politics, as the pendulum swung 
once more in favor of Turkey.  
All these factors played a part in varying degrees in the 
developments of the relations between secular and Western-
oriented Turkey and Islamic and anti-Western Iran.125  
The American embassy takeover and seizure of diplomats as hostages in 
Tehran strained the relations between Turkey and Iran, but Turkey did not join 
the United States embargo on Iran. “The Turkish government condemned the 
Iranian behavior but also rejected U.S. demands for the use of the Incirlik bases 
in case of a military intervention inside Iran. This decision was closely related to 
the 1974–1978 U.S. arms embargo on Turkey”.126  
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In response to Turkey’s rejection of the U.S. embargo on Iran, the Iranian 
government offered to develop both economic and political relations with Turkey. 
Turkey accepted this offer because of its serious budget and balance-of-
payments deficits. “Thus, Turkey sent a message to U.S. authorities in April 1980 
stressing ‘the special nature of the historical good relations with Iran’ and stating 
‘we said that the sanctions could not be beneficial [but would] be harmful. We are 
a neighboring country with Iran and have historical ties which will also be in the 
future’”.127 The following table shows the sizeable increase of foreign trade 
between 1980–1985 due to the Iran–Iraq War and the increases and decreases 
of trade values according to changing policies between Turkey and Iran until 
2004. 
                                            
127 Unal Gundogan, “Islamist Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State Pragmatism and Ideological 
Influences”, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Volume 7, No.1 March 2003, 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a1.html (accessed February 21, 2009). 
 49
 
Table 1.   Turkish–Iranian Foreign Trade Statistics Chart128 
After the Islamic revolution, Iran was trying to spread the ideology of 
revolution towards the Shiites living in Iraq and supporting the Kurdish groups 
against Iraq. This actions of Iran and the dispute over the waterway of Shatt-ul 
Arab forced Iraq to mobilize its forces. Iraq wanted to take advantage of the weak 
situation of Iran, and thus waged war against Iran in 1980.129 This war continued 
for eight years and ended in 1988. Although Turkey was not happy with Iran’s 
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Iran–Iraq war and protected her relations with both states until the end of war. 
“Turkey’s main concern was preserving the power balance in the region and 
securing the oil-supply lines”.130  
At the same time, Turkey started to struggle with PKK terrorism after 
1983, and this became another problematic issue between Ankara and Tehran. 
“Ankara blamed Tehran for allowing PKK terrorists to use Iranian territory as a 
base for their attacks on Turkey. Iran, on the other hand, accused Turkey of 
supporting anti-revolutionary forces, such as the Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MKO) 
within Iran”.131 Iran’s support of PKK terrorism caused deep resentment in Turkey 
and sometimes PKK terrorism brought the two rival states to the brink of hot 
conflicts. “Turkey requested Iran to sign a similar ‘hot pursuit’ agreement to the 
one it had done with Iraq in October 1984, but Iran did not accept at first. 
However, it was vital for Iran that Turkey continued its neutral stance and, thus 
they signed an agreement in November 1984 with Turkey promising that they 
would not allow activity that would threaten Turkey’s security on Iranian 
territory”.132 
Turkey mobilized its armed forces against the PKK terrorists in the north of 
Iraq and conducted several operations in 1986 and 1987. After these operations 
“Mejlis spokesman Hashemi Rafsanjani claimed that Ankara was planning to 
capture the oilfields of Kirkuk. Tehran continued these claims in the 1990s  
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too”.133 According to Nadir Entessar, Tehran was afraid of Turkey’s aim to 
directly control the oil fields in the north of Iraq and, by doing so, changing the 
balance of power in the region.134  
B. AFTER THE COLD WAR 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War caused a 
vacuum of power over which Turkey and Iran struggled. The Turkic and Muslim 
independent states of the old Soviet Union became the subject of rivalry between 
Turkey and Iran. “Both countries underlined their common history, values, and 
linguistic and religious affinities with the peoples of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Western countries, especially the United States, which feared the 
spread of political Islam in the area and regarded Turkey as a ‘model’ to the 
former Soviet republics, supported Ankara’s efforts”.135 
Iran’s most concerning issue was the situation of newly independent 
Azerbaijan and the ten million Azeri who live in Iran and control seventy-five 
percent of the markets of Tehran. Once in 1946 Azeri nationalists of Iran tried to 
establish Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and Kurds tried to establish Mahabad 
Republic but failed. Thus, Iran had two threats against its integrity after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.136   
According to Robert Olson, “there were three main geostrategic and 
geopolitical issues” between Iran and Turkey to be agreed on: 
1. Common interests in the oil and gas reserves and the 
distribution of these, 
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2. The willingness of the both states to refrain from Caucasian 
and Central Asian politics and especially Azeri matters in 
Azerbaijan and Iran, 
3. The need to agree on the Turkish and Iranian areas of 
interest in the north of Iraq.137 
Another and, in fact, more important issue was the nationalist movements 
of the Kurds in three neighboring states. The Kurdish problem was considered to 
be one of the most important threats to the integrity of Turkey, Iran, and Syria, 
who signed many security protocols and organized a dozen meetings related to 
this problem and to preventing the possibility of a Kurdish state in the north of 
Iraq.138  
The parliamentary elections of 1995 in Turkey resulted in the victory of 
Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) with a 21.3 percent voter 
turnout. According to Olson, “As Tehran knew, while Erbakan was a big 
supporter and a fan of the Islamic regime in Iran, he was suspicious towards the 
United States and struggling for establishing D-8 economic organization which 
would include Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, Malaysia, 
and Egypt”.139 Erbakan made his first foreign-country visit to Iran and took some 
important steps to crush the PKK with the cooperation of Iran. He signed a 23-
billion-dollar natural gas agreement with Iran although the United States 
Congress had put sanctions on to companies that invested more than 40-million 
dollars in Iranian oil and gas.140  
Although Turkey and Iran resolved some problems between them and 
signed economic agreements, Turkish–Iranian relations were getting worse 
towards the end of the 1990s. Ankara warned Iran not to interfere in its domestic 
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affairs by means of radical Islamic organizations that were being used to agitate 
against the secular regime in Turkey. “The events reached a peak on the night of 
February 1, 1997, when during the commemoration of ‘Jerusalem Day’ in Sincan 
(a small town in the environs of the Turkish capital of Ankara), posters of 
Hizbullah and Hamas were displayed and the participants strongly criticized the 
secular regime of the Turkish Republic. One of the participants, then-Iranian 
ambassador to Turkey Mohammed Reza Bagheri, reportedly called for the 
institution of Shari‘a in Turkey”.141 This event caused deep anger and a crisis in 
Ankara, and Bagheri and Istanbul consulate Mohammed Riza Rashid were 
pronounced “persona non grata.” Later, both states called back their 
ambassadors.142 
PKK terrorism became again a problem between Iran and Turkey in 1999, 
when Öcalan was captured and brought to Turkey. “The biggest demonstrations 
were organized by the members of the PKK settled in Iran, when Öcalan was 
captured. Moreover, upon the closure of Syrian border, PKK militants started to 
pass into Turkey through Iran”.143 Iran blamed Turkey for student events in Iran, 
then claimed that a village in Iran was bombed by Turkish planes. “These were 
followed by the arrest of two Turkish soldiers who crossed the border and 
entered Iran by mistake. The crisis started by these arrests ended only with the 
release of the Turkish soldiers. In the meantime, Iran surprisingly accepted ‘joint 
and sudden’ inspection and ‘synchronized’ joint operation, which had been 
demanded by Turkey for long time, in the places where PKK was active inside 
the Iranian border”.144 
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According to Gokhan Cetinsaya, Turkey changed its position toward Iran 
after September 11. “Following the events leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, the relationship between Turkey and Iran has seemingly entered a new 
phase. Similar concerns about the probable consequences of developments in 
Iraq have caused the two countries’ positions with respect to regional political 
issues to converge”.145 Turkey and Iran lost their influence in the north of Iraq 
after the U.S. located in Iraq. After the invasion of Iraq, the United States became 
the new neighbor of Turkey and Iran, and both states could not maneuver in the 
area without U.S. permission.146   
Although relations between Turkey and Iran have had their ups and downs 
in history and “in spite of the stark ideological differences, since the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002, Turkey and Iran 
have increasingly cooperated on a variety of fronts. The AKP’s Islamic 
credentials and affinity for the Muslim world have certainly helped Iran and 
Turkey get closer, but it would be wrong to assume that this is the most important 
reason for the warming of relations”.147 The Turkish government has been 
looking for good relations with its neighbors and producing policies and economic 
links that will work for this purpose.  
In this context, “today, the geopolitical situation has provided ample 
opportunities for Turkey and Iran to become friendlier. Cooperation comes mainly 
in the form of energy arrangements, where Turkey looks to Iran’s abundant oil 
and gas resources to supply its growing energy needs. The situation in Northern 
Iraq also provides a point of convergence with both countries combating Kurdish 
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separatist groups based in this autonomous region”.148 Since Turkey’s energy 
demand is increasing and Turkey imports ninety percent of its energy, Iran came 
into prominence as a close energy source to meet the energy problem. Thus, 
Iran is the second largest energy supplier to Turkey, after Russia.149 
Turkey remains in a difficult situation in becoming closer to Iran, due to 
Iran’s worsening relations with the West because of its nuclear program and 
support of terrorist groups. According to McCurdy, “Ankara prefers to follow a 
pragmatic policy and stress the positive aspects of its relationship with Iran, but 
does not want this to come at the expense of its Western orientation”.150 Mustafa 
Kibaroglu states that “Turkey’s official stance toward Iran’s nuclear program is 
clear. Turkey recognizes the right of Iran, which is a member of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to develop nuclear technology, 
provided that it remains on a peaceful track and allows for the application of full- 
scope safeguards inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
in such a way that would lend the utmost confidence to the international 
community about its intentions”.151 
Turkish–Iranian relations and their future seem likely to be directly affected 
by Turkey’s position as a member of the United Nations Security Council for the 
period of 2009 to 2010 and a newly elected member of the board of governors of 
the IAEA, which has been busy researching suspicious nuclear activity in Iran.152 
According to Kibaroglu, “Bearing in mind the rivalry between the Turks and 
the Iranians throughout history, despite the fact that some common concerns 
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exist as regards their national interests, the scope and the content of Turkish- 
Iranian relations may not go far beyond the present levels unless Turkey makes 
a radical turn in its relations with the West in general, and with the United States 
in particular, even if they may not be at satisfactory levels either”.153 
In conclusion, it seems difficult for Turkey and Iran to establish a healthy 
relation, since Turkey remains dedicated to Western values and develops its 
democracy, human rights, and modernization. Iran sees these values as evil and 
struggles against them. These values are considered as highly dangerous for the 
continuation of the Islamic regime in Iran, thus Iran does not hide its discomfort 
about these issues. For example, when they visit Turkey they do not visit 
Anitkabir, which is the place of Ataturk’s cemetery. They see Ataturk as the 
founder of these values. So, there may be relative development of the relations 
between Turkey and Iran, but it seems very difficult for both states to overcome 
their biases about each other and relations of both states can prosper only under 
common threats and only for economic and political needs for specific periods. 
Even in the best days of both states during Ataturk and Reza Shah Pahlavi, both 
states approached each other with suspicions. Turkish-Iranian rivalry seems to 
continue regarding the long history of rivalry.  
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IV. PROS AND CONS OF ALIGNING WITH THE U.S. OR IRAN 
One of the most important rules of international relations is that there is no 
friendship between states and governments, only interests. Sometimes states 
cannot reach their interests without the help of another state. In that situation, 
“alliance” formation becomes a valuable key for states to achieve their goals. The 
most important reason for making an individual alliance is to achieve goals that 
cannot be achieved alone. This rule is the same for states. States need each 
other’s capabilities in order to reach their own purposes by giving back 
something in return. While choosing allies, states calculate their strategic 
interests and the goals they will reach owing to the alliance. 
When we look at Turkish–American relations through this window, Turkey 
and the United States have gained a lot from one another’s capabilities by being 
allies. Turkey and the United States have been allies since the end of the Second 
World War. This alliance has survived many vicissitudes and persevered even 
through harsh disagreements. The United States and Turkey supported each 
other in many occasions during this period; in many crisis and wars, Turkey has 
stood with the United States. According to Joshua Walker, “although the United 
States and Turkey have had serious policy disagreements in the past, there has 
always been an overarching strategic vision to keep the alliance intact”.154  
America’s first support came when Turkey was under a dangerous threat 
from her historical adversary, the Soviet Union, in the beginning of the Cold War. 
Turkey had waged wars against the Russians, whose biggest dream for 
centuries has been to capture Istanbul and both Turkish straits connecting the 
Mediterranean to the Black Sea so Russia can reach the Mediterranean. The 
Soviet Union was using direct, arrogant language against Turkey about its aim 
instead of political language. American support in such a difficult time was 
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crucially important, because Turkey was in need of help that was very difficult to 
find. The United States supported Turkey not only militarily but also economically 
and psychologically for a long time against the threat of communism. “As part of 
the cooperative effort to further Turkish economic and military self-reliance, the 
United States has loaned and granted Turkey more than $12.5 billion in 
economic aid and more than $14 billion in military assistance”.155 Table-2 on the 
next page shows the U.S. aid to Turkey from the very beginning of the alliance to 
present. 
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The United States has been backing Turkey in the areas of energy 
security and alternative paths to bring Central Asian oil and gas to world markets. 
In this important project, “Prime Minister Ecevit told American officials that Turkey 
would not be able to collect the 2.5 billion dollars needed to complete the Baku–
Tiflis–Ceyhan pipeline during his trip to the United States in 2002”.156 Vice 
President Dick Cheney promised Ecevit to find the source needed to complete 
the pipeline and did so with the help of the World Bank.157  
American presidents and congresses have supported Turkey’s struggle to 
be a member of the European Union for a long time. In this regard, Kemal Kirisci 
stated that:  
In respect to the EU, the United States has very actively pushed for 
Turkish membership even when this has meant friction with some 
European governments. The United States played a critical role in 
ensuring the ratification of the Customs Union Treaty signed 
between Turkey and the EU in 1995. The United States clearly 
sees the issue of Turkish membership in strategic terms and 
argues that membership would enhance Turkish economic 
development and democracy, while also helping make Turkey a 
much more stable country in a critical neighborhood. This logic has 
also been pursued in respect to including and actively promoting 
Turkey as one of the big emerging markets deserving U.S. 
investment.158  
Turkey has generally achieved the support of the United States in the 
struggle with terrorism. The United States declared Turkey’s right to defend itself 
against terrorism in many platforms. President Bush welcomed Prime Minister 
Erdogan in 2007 for a White House visit and gave his and his government’s full 
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backing to Turkey in its fight against terrorism by the PKK or Kongra-Gel, which 
he characterized as a "common enemy" of Turkey, Iraq, and the United 
States.159  
The economic dimension of Turkish-U.S. relations has been considered to 
be inadequate by Turkish politicians. However, one of the latest measures to 
improve the deteriorating relations between the United States and Turkey is 
related to trade and economics. “The U.S. and Turkey for several years have had 
a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, which met in Turkey in January 
2009. In 2002, the two countries indicated their joint intent to upgrade bilateral 
economic relations by launching an Economic Partnership Commission, which 
last convened in Washington in April 2008. In 2006, Turkish exports to the U.S. 
totaled about $5.4 billion, and U.S. exports to Turkey totaled $5.7 billion”.160  
Besides there having been a variety of advantages to being an ally of the 
United States, Turkey lived through some bad experiences and encountered 
some disadvantages in its relations with the U.S. One of the most important 
disadvantages happened with the Cuban missile crisis, in which Turkey was not 
consulted by its ally, the United States, in order to solve the crisis with the Soviet 
Union. The second was President Johnson’s letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu. 
The letter was a warning to Turkey not to act unilaterally in the Cyprus problem 
and if did, not to expect U.S. or NATO support if the Soviet Union intervened in 
response to Turkey’s act against Cyprus. The third was the economic burden 
paid by Turkey after Gulf War I, which was conducted under the leadership of the 
United States against Iraq. The results of Gulf War I were not only economically, 
but also strategically, dangerous cons for Turkey. Finally, the most important 
cons of this alliance happened after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The 
Kurdish groups in the north of Iraq built a semiautonomous structure which was a 
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danger to the integrity of Iraq. Turkey mentioned the importance of Iraq many 
times in order to prevent further crises and cons for all sides in the future.  
Looking at the relations between Turkey and Iran through the interest 
window, there is not a good background for improved relations between the two 
states. Although Turkey and Iran are neighbors, there has always been a 
problem of trust. Even when they came together for common interests, they 
could not overcome the trust problem, which is one of the most important issues 
of bilateral relations. Iran’s interest in exporting its regime to Turkey and other 
neighboring states has always been a matter of tension between two states.  
According to Sedat Laciner, 
It must be a natural expectation for neighboring states like Turkey 
and Iran to look for a serious economic rapprochement, even 
integration. However, when one looks at the relations, one meets a 
very unhealthy picture:  
Iran is among states like China and Russia to which Turkey has a 
foreign-trade deficit. It has already gone beyond five-billion dollars. 
While seventy-five percent of the trade is constituted by gas 
purchase, only two-billion dollars is left for the trade apart from 
energy trade. Although Turkish industry, agriculture, and 
stockbreeding is very suitable for meeting Iran’s needs, Iran does 
not indulge in Turkish goods and trade does not reach the desired 
level and velocity. The situation in direct investments is worse. 
Turkish investors who want to enter the Iranian market face 
incredible obstacles. Leaving aside enjoying the status of a 
neighbor state and being Muslim with the same culture, Turkish 
investors can come face to face with special hindrances just 
because of being Turkish. After passing over all these hindrances 
and reaching the end of a business bid, the whole process can be 
cancelled suddenly. Turkcell and TAV failures became two open 
examples about these hindrances. It is certain that there are some 
forces that do not want to see more Turkish companies in Iran, with 
the underlying idea that ‘Turkey is the spy of the United States and 







there will be a counterrevolution. Although Turkey’s active policy 
after the 1 March draft and invasion of Iraq softened these kinds of 
ideas, Turkey is still a country which must be treated 
suspiciously.161    
Although the best-known idea about Turkish–Iranian relations is that 
“Turkish–Iranian relations have been peaceful since 1639 Kasr-i Sirin 
agreement,” Soner Cagaptay disagrees with this idea and calls it as a myth. He 
states that,  
Turkey and Iran have repeatedly fought since the 1639, and since 
the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has supported terror groups inside 
Turkey to undermine Ankara. First a bit of history: the Ottoman and 
Iranian Empires have fought many wars since Kasr-i Sirin. For 
instance, a full-scale war broke out in 1733 when the Persians 
attempted to take Baghdad from the Turks. The Persian siege of 
Baghdad and the accompanying battles ended in 1746 with the 
Treaty of Kurdan, signed between the new Zand Dynasty of Persia 
and the Ottoman Empire. Soon after, in 1775, the Zand Dynasty 
attacked the Ottoman Empire again and captured Basra. The 
invasion lasted until 1821, at which time another war started 
between the Ottoman Empire and the new Qajar Dynasty of Persia. 
The war ended in 1823, with the First Treaty of Erzurum. Rivalry 
over the Muhammarah region (modern day Khorramshar, Iran) 
deepened the conflict between the two empires by adding a new 
dimension to the conflict. Persians and Ottoman Iraqi governors 
clashed over its control, bringing the two empires to the brink of war 
in 1840. The British intervened, establishing a boundary 
commission composed of Iranian, Turkish, British, and Russian 
diplomats. As a result, the Persian and the Ottoman Empires 
signed the Second Treaty of Erzurum, which reconfigured the 
Iranian-Ottoman border. In 1930, when some Kurds launched a 
rebellion around Mount Greater Agri (Ararat) in Turkey, Kurdish 
bands armed by Armenian nationalists entered Turkey across the 
Iranian border to support the rebellion. This was not a small 
skirmish. Turkey used airplanes in a counterattack and mobilized 
15,000 troops to suppress the incursion. In the end, the Turkish 
army was able to put down the border infiltration, though with great 
difficulty, and only after losing several planes. In 1931, Ankara 
asked Iran for a border rectification that put Mount Lesser Agri, the 
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base of the 1930 incursions, inside Turkey. Volatility along the 
border became an issue again when the terrorist Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK) launched a campaign against Turkey in 1984. Iran's 
theocratic regime, which is diametrically opposed to Turkey's 
secular, pro-Western society, saw the PKK as a useful tool with 
which to wreak havoc in Turkey. Accordingly, Tehran allowed PKK 
bases such as Haj Umran, Dar Khala, Benchul, Mandali, and 
Sirabad in its territory. Iran has supported not only the PKK but also 
Islamist terrorist cells. Since the 1979 revolution, Iranian-backed 
terrorist cells have assassinated a number of secular Turkish 
intellectuals and journalists whom they consider offensive, including 
theologian Bahriye Ucok, a female Islamist modernizer, and 
journalist Cetin Emec.162 
Although there is a growing cooperation between Turkey and Iran and 
Turkey is trying to repair relations with all its neighbors, and although Kurdish 
actions and American support to them pushes Turkey to Iran and Syria, these 
states have not been consistent towards Turkey in their history. Iran seems to be 
supporting Turkey over the Kurdish issue in Iraq for now, but it can change its 
policy easily and agree with the Kurdish groups in the north of Iraq in order to 
have a dominant position all over Iraq. Iran has not been a reliable neighbor of 
Turkey and other Sunni states of the Middle East and in many occasions moved 
in the opposite direction to its own official statements. For example, the latest 
developments happen to force Iran to be friendly towards Turkey since Iran has 
been under harsh sanctions of the United States and the international 
community, yet Iran still does not act in a trustworthy manner in bilateral relations 
with Turkey.  
Turkey signed some energy agreements with Iran in order to diversify its 
energy sources, but Iran tried to use this as a trump against Turkey by 
decreasing the gas flow in the middle of winter when its people needed gas. 
Even though Iran needs Turkey in order to decrease the damage of isolation 
from the world, Iran still does not trust Turkish companies and prevents Turkish 
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companies from investing in Iran. The history of Turkey and Iran is generally 
described as a long rivalry that is the source of multiple disadvantages between 
two states. Even though Turkish–Iranian relations have been improving lately, 
this is not a natural development between the two neighboring states and is not a 
guarantee for the future. Iran’s unfavorable identity in the international community 
related to its nuclear research can put Turkey in a difficult position between Iran 
and Turkey’s Western allies.   
It seems a little bit complicated for Turkey to find the right direction for its 
interests in the region under present conditions. During the Bush administration, 
Turkey distanced itself from the United States and Turkish-American relations 
experienced deep declines after the United States invaded Iraq. Turkey’s alliance 
with the United States cost Turkey a great deal in last decade, and Turkey 
started to find a way out with the regional states for regional problems. Turkey 
and the new Obama administration should find a common way and turn from this 
decline to development of better relations between Turkey and the United States 
for the sake of their interests. Although Turkey and Iran seem to share common 
goals about Kurdish separatism in the region, and energy issues for the future, in 
fact even in the matter of Kurdish separatism there is not a guarantee for 
bilaterally coordinated action. Iran supported the Kurdish terrorists for a 
considerable time against Turkey and can do the same thing when the interests 
diverge. Iran has been increasing its influence in Iraq and can use this force to 
spread its force over Kurds in the north of Iraq and may again diverge from 
Turkey in the future. Although Turkey supports the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy by Iran, Turkey can be in a difficult situation if Iran seeks to be a nuclear 
armed power and destroy the historical balance, which is the source of peace 
between two neighboring states. Thus, Turkey and the United States should 
redefine their goals and coordinate them with each other in order to be in the 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis is to find answers to questions about Turkish 
foreign-policy change in a new era. The possibility of a common ground for 
Turkey and Iran to cooperate for the stability of the region, Turkey’s improving 
relations with Iran even in the face of U.S. opposition, and similar questions 
about the future of Turkish–American and Turkish–Iranian relations are being 
asked frequently after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the deterioration of Turkish-
U.S. relations. This evaluation is very important not only for Turkey and for Iran, 
but also for the United States and her interests in the region, and for the future 
stability of the region itself. 
I can surely say that Turkish foreign policy has been changing since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and evaporation of the communist threat, which 
was the main glue of bipolar world alliances. After being released from the 
confining environment of a bipolar world order, not only Turkey, but also many 
other states started to move and act more freely. Contrary to negative predictions 
about Turkey’s declining importance to her allies, Turkey’s importance has 
increased as conflicts started to pop up with the relief and free movement that 
appeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Here, Turkey’s importance has 
different meanings for two different sides: on one side, Turkey’s old ally the 
United States and the West; and on the other side, especially after the 
government change in Turkey and rule of the AKP government, neighboring 
states such as Iran and Syria that had been trouble for Turkey for many years. 
For the United States, Turkey was a key ally to support the troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, to continue to support power projection in the Middle East, and 
nowadays to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq over Turkey. For Iran, Turkey 
became an important neighbor and trade partner for breaking Iran’s isolation and 
becoming a bridge between Iran and Europe.  
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The hostility between the United States and Iran seems to put Turkey in a 
very difficult position in the near future regarding Iran’s continuing nuclear 
research. Turkey does not look with favor on the nuclear activities of Iran, but 
also does not want to solve this problem by use of force and does not want 
another war with unpredictable results, which will certainly damage Turkey at 
least as much as the participating sides.  
Turkey as a state in a strategic location, which connects east to west and 
north to south, continued her close alliance with the United States after 1991 
even though she did improve her interests, she suffered many losses in the 
subsequent period. The United States did not pay attention to the voice of Turkey 
and sought its own interest at the expense of damaging Turkish interests and 
violating Turkish “red lines.” Although Turkey and the United States diverged in 
their Iraq policies, Turkey supported the United States during its stabilization 
operations in Iraq. But what did Turkey achieve for its support? A fragmented 
Iraq, a semiautonomous Kurdish region seeking independence in the north of 
Iraq, increasing PKK terror coming from the north of Iraqi territories under the 
control of the United States, and unheeded Turkish warnings about the future of 
Kirkuk and the Turkmen population of Kirkuk. 
These are the issues distancing Turkey from its old ally the United States 
and forcing her to take care of her own problems and fulfill national interests by 
establishing regional alliances, especially against common threats. This seems to 
be the most basic right of Turkey regarding American policies in sustaining 
stability with the help of Kurds in Iraq. There is an emerging general idea in 
Turkey that if the United States has the right to develop relations with Kurds in 
the north of Iraq for their common goals, although sustainability is open to debate 
regarding the background of Turkish–Iranian relations, it must be Turkey’s right 
to develop good relations with Iran, which has common interests and goals with 
Turkey about PKK/PJAK terrorism, the Kurdish independence movement in the 
north of Iraq, energy security, regional stability and other economic interests.  
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According to Ahmet Davutoglu, senior advisor to the Turkish premier on 
foreign politics, Turkey must develop relations with her neighbors to the level of 
“zero problems” in the new world order and use strategic depth to protect stability 
in the region. I agree with his idea and think that Turkey should be a central state 
that can develop good relations with all sides and mediate the troubled issues 
between these sides to protect stability and peace. Turkey is a unique state that 
contains all surrounding cultures in its body. Turkey has some European culture, 
some Arabic, some Caucasian, some Balkan, some Mediterranean, some 
Anatolian, some Kurdish, some Shiite, some Sunni and some Turkish culture. 
You can see the signs, tastes, customs and lifestyles of all these different 
cultures in Turkey living together in the same street, village, or province. This is 
the soft power of Turkey and because of this, Turkey must be taken into account 
regarding regional problems. 
After the 1 March draft crisis, many said that Turkey should have moved 
with the United States in 2003 in order to have a seat at the table on the future of 
Iraq. But some ask whether the American policy in Iraq is successful after 
hearing the following statement of Necirvan Barzani, “If the disputes remain after 
the U.S. leaves, it will be war between both sides".163 What kind of war will it be? 
Who will be involved in that war? What will be the effects of this war to the region 
and regional stability which is in the interest of all sides? This was the main 
reason Turkey did not support the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  
Turkey and the United States have tightened relations in the period 
following the invasion of Iraq, and both states have still common interests in the 
region. Turkey and the United States share the idea of “strategic partnership” and 
they can find a common way that can serve their interests and goals. In order to 
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do this, both sides should develop mechanisms to understand events in the 
region and predict the possible results of possible actions in order to find the best 
way to solve troubles. 
Turkey’s alliance with Iran at the strategic level seems full of structural and 
deep-rooted hindrances, due to their long history of rivalries and struggles. The 
basic differences between Turkey and Iran can easily come up to the surface 
even in the best period of bilateral relations. Even though there is a group in 
Turkey looking sympathetically towards Iran, just because Iran is a Muslim state, 
there is another large group who are well aware of the history of Turkish–Iranian 
relations and the inconsistency of Iran. In addition to these two groups, there is 
another group who is like the second group, but just for parallel interests with Iran 
partially supports this policy. After the American invasion of Iraq, political 
attitudes entered into a relative change. Iran, which had been supporting the PKK 
terrorists in order to balance Turkey in colliding interests, suddenly changed their 
policies and seemed to be Turkey’s close neighbor and enemy of the PKK. After 
being the target of PJAK, which is brother of PKK, Iran ceased its support to PKK 
and started to fight against PKK terrorists.   
Another important matter is Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Iran seeks to be the 
second nuclear power in the Middle East, after Israel. For the present, the 
Turkish government seems to be giving a green light to Iran in order to protect 
developing economic relations and stability in the region and create a balancing 
countermeasure to the possibility of Kurdish independence in Iraq. The Kurdish-
nationalism threat seems to be the important issue that distances Turkey from 
the United States and brings it closer it to Iran. However, Turkey and Turkish 
politicians should realize the danger and the possibility of losing control to a 
dominance-seeking nuclear Iran, which can cause irremediable consequences. 
Turkey’s decision in favor of an inconsistent nuclear neighbor may turn into an 
uncalculated threat to stability, from which there is no re-turn. The historical 
background of Turkish–Iranian relations and the unbalanced attitudes of Iran in 
the Middle East—not only towards Turkey, but also towards the most of the 
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Sunni Muslim states—create questions about the reliability of Iran and its future 
attitudes in different political conditions. Regarding historical background and the 
general idea about Iran, nobody can guarantee the future attitudes of a nuclear 
Iran if Turkish and Iranian interests diverge.  
Under these circumstances, there may be strained days ahead for Turkey 
regarding ongoing nuclear research of Iran and the United States opposition to 
these activities, the Kurdish issue in Iraq, and the future of Kirkuk and the 
Turkmen. Turkey may be in the same position she was in prior to the United 
States invasion of Iraq in 2003, between a neighbor seeking improved relations 
and an ally with conflicting interests over Iraq, Kurds, Kirkuk’s future and Iran 
policies. Turkish political elites observing bilateral relations on all sides may 
remain under pressure to find a way out that will satisfy all sides and protect 
stability in the region, which is the most beneficial option for Turkish interests. 
According to Soner Cagaptay, “Dangerously shorn as it is of Middle Eastern 
allies, Washington cannot afford further deterioration in its relations with a 
country that has long been one of the Western world’s greatest allies in the 
region”.164  
Finally, both the American and Turkish policy elite should 
emphasize the shared values between Turks, Americans, and the 
wider Western world, highlighting Turkey’s unique status as a 
secular, Muslim-majority democracy with strong ties to the West.165  
To do this, Turkey and the United States should establish a stronger 
structure to synchronize relations and not find themselves in a “lose-lose” 
position by ignoring each other’s priorities. 
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